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Poetry holds a particular position among the arts.
It alone knows the secret of arousal [erweckung]
and the secret of transition [übergang].1
In , one year after the publication of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
a volume of poetry was published by Stefan George (  – ), the 
aging poet who, as master of the extremely in.uential literary and aca-
demic George Circle (George-Kreis), had become one of the intellectual 
leaders of early th-century Germany.2 The volume, which was to be 
George’s last one, bore an ominous title: Das Neue Reich, “Kingdom 
Come,” or, “the New Realm,” “the New Reich.” It contained poems 
written during and after the First World War and voiced a disappoint-
ment, shared by many German artists and intellectuals, with the forms 
of political and cultural modernity dominant in the Weimar Republic. 
With an evocative emphasis on themes like war, visionary leadership, 
and artistic and military heroism, the -rst part of the anthology heralds 
the coming restoration of a German Reich – not so much as a political 
form of government but rather as an intellectual and spiritual realm, 
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based on the guidance of the visionary poet-artist. In a poem entitled 
“Der Dichter in Zeiten der Wirren” (“The Poet in Times of Confu-
sion”), a title reminiscent of Hölderlin’s famous question, “whereto 
poets in meager times?” (wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit?),3 George pro-
claims the following task for the poet-bard:
   er holt aus büchern
Der ahnen die verheissung die nicht trügt
Dass die erkoren sind zum höchsten ziel
Zuerst durch tiefste öden ziehn dass einst
Des erdteils herz die welt erretten soll … 
    er heftet
Das wahre sinnbild auf das völkische banner
Er führt durch sturm und grausige signale
Des frührots seiner treuen schar zum werk
Des wachen tags und p.anzt das Neue Reich. 
  he [the bard] retrieves from books
Of ancestors the pledge that does not fail
That those selected for the highest aim
First drag through deepest wastelands; that the world
Shall once be rescued by the continent’s heart … 
    he attaches
The true symbol to the popular banner
He leads through storm and daybreak’s dismal signals
His loyal troops and sets them to the work
Of sober day and plants the Realm To Come.4
Given its title and its thematic emphasis, it is no wonder that this work 
by George, who was already regarded as a national hero, also attracted 
the attention of the National Socialist movement, keen on identify-
ing the “New Reich” with the Third Reich. Soon after Hitler became 
Chancellor in January , George was o,ered the presidency of the 
Prussian Academy of Poetry (which he declined) and was warmly 
greeted on his th birthday by the new Reich Minister of Propaganda, 
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Joseph Goebbels, himself an ardent admirer of George’s work. While 
apparently not without some sympathies for the “national movement,” 
George did not want to become associated with the new regime. His 
death in December  spared him from experiencing the full real-
ity of the new German Reich, but also made him unable to prevent 
the exploitation of his work by Nazi cultural politics; at Goebbels’ be-
hest, the German national book award was (temporarily) renamed the 
“Stefan George Prize.”5 In the long run, however, George’s aristocratic 
ethos and aestheticism turned out to be ill-adapted to a totalitarian 
mass ideology. One of the principal conspirators in the July  plot 
against Hitler’s life, Colonel Claus von Stau,enberg, was a former mem-
ber of the George Circle. According to some accounts, Stau,enberg’s last 
words at his execution invoked George’s “secret Germany,” the spiritual 
Reich, as a symbol of resistance.6
 Of the numerous volumes of poetry published by George, Das Neue 
Reich was the one that caught the attention of Heidegger who, even 
after his quick personal disillusionment with National Socialism, was 
careful to lecture mainly on works and authors considered politically 
acceptable in the Third Reich.7 In his  seminar on Herder’s Treatise 
on the Origin of Language (), attempting a radical re.ection on 
the concept of language prevalent in Western metaphysics and its un-
thought foundations, Heidegger also makes some inconclusive remarks 
on Das Neue Reich,8 declaring enigmatically: “George speaks, barely 
intimating it, in a transitional way [übergänglich].”9 
 What does Heidegger mean by “transition” (Übergang) and “tran-
sitional?” These expressions gain special signi-cance in the posthu-
mously published Contributions to Philosophy from   – . Here he 
speaks of a transition from the “-rst beginning” (der erste Anfang) of 
Western thinking to its other beginning (der andere Anfang).10 This 
transition is a historical process that characterizes the presently unfold-
ing philosophical – or rather, post-philosophical – epoch: “The Contri-
butions enact a questioning along a pathway which is -rst traced out 
by the transition to the other beginning, into which Western thinking 
is now entering.”11 
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 For Heidegger, the “-rst beginning” is the point of departure that 
provides the guiding framework for the development of Western phi-
losophy, all the way from the Presocratics and Plato up to Nietzsche. 
The thinking that remains within the sphere of the -rst beginning – by 
Heidegger’s de-nition, Western metaphysics as such – is primarily oc-
cupied with Aristotle’s fundamental ontological question concerning 
beings qua beings (to on hê on), in other words, the pure being-ness 
of determinate beings as speci-c instances of “to be.” According to 
Heidegger’s seminal claim, the implicit ideal and standard of being-
ness in Greek metaphysics is constant presence, i.e., permanent and self-
identical accessibility to immediate awareness – for him, the concrete 
sense of Aristotle’s ousia.12
 In Heidegger’s historical narrative, the Western metaphysics of 
presence unfolds through several historical phases. Whereas the Greeks 
conceived of presence as the givenness of beings to the primarily re-
ceptive sense perception (aisthêsis) and intuitive apprehending (nous), 
modern, Post-Cartesian metaphysics increasingly discovers the ideal 
form of presence in the cogito, the indubitably certain presence-to-itself 
of self-conscious human subjectivity.13 Heidegger asserts that this meta-
physics of subjectivity -nds its culmination in the fundamental notions 
of Nietzsche’s philosophy – for him, the eternal recurrence of the same 
as the inherently meaningless basic nature of reality and the will to 
power as the value-creating and endlessly self-enhancing driving force 
behind subjectivity – which exhaust the last possibilities for thinking 
implicitly contained in the Greek beginning, thereby bringing about 
the completion and end of the metaphysical tradition.14 With Nietzsche, 
we enter an epoch in which the initial Greek receptivity and open-
ness of thinking to the spontaneous self-givenness of beings, physis, is 
increasingly superseded by the active domination of reality in the form 
of positive techno-science.15
With Nietzsche’s metaphysics, philosophy is com-
pleted. That means: It has gone through the sphere of 
pre-gured possibilities. Completed metaphysics, which 
is the ground for the planetary manner of thinking, 
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gives the sca,olding for an order of the earth that will 
supposedly last for a long time. … But with the end of 
philosophy, thinking is not also at its end, but in transi-
tion to another beginning.16
The eventual release of thinking from the con-nes of the now oversatu-
rated Western metaphysics would require a profound transformation, 
a transition to another point of departure. Techno-scienti-c modernity, 
the outcome of metaphysics, focuses its attention on rendering real-
ity more and more purely present, available, and controllable as ma-
terial for the productive purposes of human subjectivity. Transitional 
thinking, in its turn, entails an awareness of the way in which the 
meaningful givenness of something as present is dependent upon and 
refers back to a multidimensional background context that is, as such, 
not a determinate thing and therefore not immediately present, un-
accessible, un-wieldy – no-thing. It is the di,erentiation of something 
from a context of no-thing-ness that “gives” beings as meaningful in 
a singular context, in a concrete temporal situation; thus, the mean-
ingfulness of presence is no longer regarded as an accomplishment of 
the meaning-giving activity of subjectivity, but rather as a -nite and 
temporal gift that man receives.17 
 The only name the later Heidegger would consistently give to this 
still largely virtual and only gradually emerging postmetaphysical 
possibility of thought is “Being-historical” or “Being-destinal” (seyns-
geschichtlich) thinking. Being-historical thinking experiences Being 
(Seyn, now with the archaic spelling to distinguish it from Sein in the 
metaphysical sense of beingness) in terms of a historical “destiny” (Ge-
schick) that “dispatches” (schicken) meaningfulness to the human being 
in historically changing con-gurations, as an “event” or a “taking-place” 
(Ereignis) that overtakes and appropriates (ereignet) human being to be 
its situational and contextual “place” (the Da of Da-sein, now conceived 
of as an essential historical possibility of being-human).18 We begin to 
sense a profound kinship between Heidegger’s postmetaphysical “other 
beginning” and George’s vision of a post-modern, poetic New Realm, 
of “a younger generation, measuring man and thing  /  Once more with 
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proper measures.”19 In a Heideggerian reading, this “proper measure” 
would be one that does not forge man and thing into two poles of a tech-
nical process of manipulation, but is rather given to us by the reciprocal 
interaction between the spontaneous disclosure of meaningful presence 
and the human capacity to experience and articulate meaning.
 Since this capacity is essentially discursive and linguistic, the 
transition to another beginning would also entail a profound transfor-
mation in the human being’s relationship to language in the sense of 
discursive meaningfulness, logos. In Heidegger’s reading of the Hera-
clitus fragments – especially fragment 7 , “When you have heard not 
me but discursive articulation [logos] itself, it is well-advised to agree 
with it [homologein]: All is One [hen panta]”20 – logos originally means 
the discursive articulation of meaningful reality as an articulated, di-
,erential, and oppositional but still ultimately uni-ed and consistent 
totality. Logos is therefore Heraclitus’ name for Being as such. In this 
initial sense, it is something that the human being does not possess but 
must instead hearken and consent to.21 Already in Aristotle, however, 
logos becomes -rst and foremost a human attribute: man is de-ned as 
zôon logon echon, the living creature that disposes of discursivity.22 In 
the seminal book of Western logic, Aristotle’s De interpretatione, logos 
is de-ned as a complex vocal utterance signifying something; its ideal 
mode is logos apophantikos, the declarative proposition that predicates 
something of something.23 
 In Heidegger’s formulation, the human being’s relationship to lan-
guage has since Aristotle been dominated by logic in the broad sense 
of a theoretical and normative account of linguistic and discursive 
meaningfulness.24 In modern times, this approach gradually devel-
ops into a formal calculus of language that aims at abstracting, from 
the contingencies and ambiguities of the historically situated and de-
veloping “ordinary language,” a universal and unambiguous system 
that could then be used to further the lucid, coherent, and e/cient 
transmission of information.25 Language is understood as an instru-
ment of communication that can be perfected through grammatical 
and syntactic calculation, based on the model of a simple declarative 
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proposition consisting of subject and predicate. Certain liberties are, of 
course, granted to poetic language; in the Romantic paradigm, poetry 
is not declarative but performative, i.e., it does not purport to convey 
information concerning external facts but rather serves the poet’s emo-
tional self-expression and self-assertion as a creative subject.26 However, 
in this case as well, language is seen as an instrument of subjectivity, 
as a means subjugated to a purpose. 
 In the Heideggerian transition, the instrumental view of language, 
as well as the entire metaphysical view of language as a system of mate-
rial signs, spoken words or written symbols equipped with a declarative 
meaning, begins to falter. What is ultimately called into question here 
is the notion of linguistic discursivity as a means that the human be-
ing has at her disposal for communicating pregiven ideal meanings. 
From the transitional perspective, language is rather experienced as 
something that “has” the human being, as the basic meaningful ar-
ticulation of reality into a relational whole which, precisely because 
of its relational and referential structure, is at once both uni-ed and 
di,erentiated. Language is not an entity that could be possessed, but 
rather the discursive articulation of meaning that always “precedes” 
the human being, in the sense that we are always born into an already 
prevailing language.27 
 It is obvious that this articulation is not universal but always tied 
to the historical and cultural world that we enter at birth. Indeed, the 
language we are born into is our culture, it is the historically developed 
interpretation of reality that we must adopt and that must adopt us; 
for it is not until we learn to speak that we truly enter our community. 
As Heidegger puts it in his  Rome lecture on “Hölderlin and the 
Essence of Poetry”:
Language is not just a tool which man possesses along-
side many others; rather, language -rst grants the 
possibility of standing in the midst of the openness of 
beings. Only where there is language, is there world … . 
Only where world holds sway is there history. … Lan-
guage is not a tool at man’s disposal but rather the event 
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[Ereignis] which disposes of the highest possibility of 
being-human.28
This experience of language is one that has perhaps, to some extent, 
always been familiar to poets – the ones who most constantly expose 
themselves to language. Heidegger’s readings of poetry concentrate on 
those modern poets whom he considers “transitional,” that is, poets 
whose work calls into question metaphysical notions of language and 
remains on the lookout for a new dimension of ultimate meaning – a 
divinity or holiness – beyond the reach of techno-scienti-c control. For 
Heidegger, the -rst and foremost “transitional” poet is Hölderlin, the 
“poet’s poet,” acutely aware of the absence of the holy. 29 Nonetheless, 
he also had high regard for turn-of-the-century German poets such as 
Trakl, Rilke, and George, all of whom Hölderlin strongly inspired.30 
 In a long meditation on language, a cycle of three lectures from 
  –  entitled “The Essence of Language,” as well as in the shorter 
 lecture “The Word,” Heidegger studies George’s poem “Das Wort” 
(“The Word”) from Das Neue Reich. This poem is, for Heidegger, an 
account of a transitional encounter and experience (Erfahrung) with 
language – an encounter in which the Romantic notion of expressive 
poetic language is unexpectedly shattered and supplanted by the ac-
knowledgement of another essence. 
 Das Wort
Wunder von ferne oder traum
Bracht ich an meines landes saum
Und harrte bis die graue norn
Den namen fand in ihrem born – 
Drauf konnt ichs greifen dicht und stark
Nun blüht und glänzt es durch die mark … 
Einst langt ich an nach guter fahrt
Mit einem kleinod reich und zart
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Sie suchte lang und gab mir kund:
“So schläft hier nichts auf tiefem grund”
Worauf es meiner hand entrann
Und nie mein land den schatz gewann … 
So lernt ich traurig den verzicht:
Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht.
 The Word
Wonder or dream from distant land
I carried to my country’s strand
And waited till the twilit norn
Had found the name within her bourn – 
Then I could grasp it close and strong
It blooms and shines now the front along … 
Once I returned from happy sail, 
I had a prize so rich and frail, 
She sought for long and tidings told: 
“No like of this these depths enfold.”
And straight it vanished from my hand, 
The treasure never graced my land … 
So I renounced and sadly see: 
Where word breaks o, no thing may be.31
The short poem, consisting of six two-line stanzas and so simple as to 
appear almost naïve, recounts two homecomings of the narrator-poet. 
The poet returns twice from a distant land, i.e., from a region beyond 
his domain and sphere of control, to his own country. On both occa-
sions, he brings something back home with him: -rst a “wonder or a 
dream,” then a “prize” or “treasure.” But in order to be brought into 
the poet’s country, these hitherto unidenti-ed presents must -rst be 
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poetically named, for otherwise they can gain neither stable identity 
nor permanence – in Hölderlin’s words, “but what endures  /  is estab-
lished by poets” (Was bleibet aber  /  stiften die Dichter).32 The naming 
takes place at the “strand,” i.e., at the limit of the poet’s domain; here an 
old Germanic goddess of fate, the norn, retrieves names from the bot-
tom of her well. Upon the poet’s second homecoming, however, the norn 
fails to discover any name for the singular treasure he is now carrying, 
and instantly the treasure vanishes from his hand. The poem ends in 
a renunciation (verzicht): the poet recognizes that “where word breaks 
o, no thing may be.” Without a naming word, the frail and ephemeral 
treasure cannot become a thing, i.e., a self-identical and stable being.
 Heidegger reads this poem very carefully and minutely, laying 
great weight even on the scanty punctuation. However, in the wider 
context of his thought, it is not hard to see the core issue here: for 
Heidegger, George’s poem recounts a transformation and transition in 
the poet’s relationship to language.33 At -rst, the poet’s assumed task 
is to conquer and appropriate new property through the naming use of 
language; the norn and her well are freely at his disposal for this func-
tion. But the disappointment on the second occasion, the unexpected 
unavailability and breakdown of the word and the subsequent loss of 
the treasure, force the poet into a resignation that marks a profound 
change in his attitude. 
 Firstly, the poet now realizes his own dependency on language. It is 
language itself and not the poet that grants beingness – stable meaning 
and identity – to beings. To rephrase Wittgenstein: the limits of the 
poet’s country are the limits of his language. But the second, more im-
portant discovery is that there is something for which there is no word, 
something that cannot be captured and made into a thing through 
naming. Heidegger stresses that we must not take the breakdown of the 
word in the second part of the poem as a contingent failure in which no 
suitable word simply happens to be present. The evanescent treasure 
must be something which cannot as such be named. 
 What is this treasure that essentially evades naming? For a hint we 
must look to the title of the poem – the Word. The treasure for which 
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there is no word is the word itself in its essence as language.34 The 
word that is experienced here is not a thing, a signi-er that is some-
how semantically related to a meaning, a signi-ed. Rather, it is the 
functioning of logos, the very articulation of a thing into a determinate 
meaningful thing. As Heidegger compactly puts it: “The word makes 
[‘be-things,’ bedingt] the thing into a thing.”35 Language as logos is the 
dynamic context for discursively constituted beings, the background 
event that can never itself become a being, resisting all objecti-cation. 
In the words of the “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” it is the “house of being.”36 
Language can never be simply a tool for the creative subjectivity of the 
poet, but the poet is always dependent on the language that precedes 
him and is constituted as a poet only by and through language. 
 Heidegger thus arrives at his famous chiasmus: “The essence of 
language: the language of essence.”37 The lectures started o, with the 
question concerning the essence of language; an attempt to answer this 
question turns it around. The essence, Wesen, the way in which lan-
guage prevails and takes place, is precisely in articulating, constituting, 
and thus rendering possible stable and de-nite identities of things. The 
essence of language is thus to be the very becoming-essential of es-
sences, the event whereby beings become beings, linguistically articu-
lated, nameable entities, and which cannot itself be similarly captured 
in a name. The purpose of Heidegger’s reading of George is to show the 
impossibility of what the title “The Essence of Language” might have 
led us to expect: a theoretical grasp or formal de-nition of language as 
an entity.38 The poetic subject of George’s poem is compelled to accept 
with sadness and resignation that language as such, the becoming-
speakable of things, is itself unspeakable. 
 However, Heidegger emphasizes that this resigned discovery is not, 
in spite of its sad mood, a failure.39 It is an important experience that 
results in a decisive change of attitude. George’s encounter with lan-
guage fruitfully inverts the attempt to speak the essence of language 
into a silent experience of the essence of language as the unspeak-
able eventful origin of speakability and, thus, of essentiality. Even 
though the poet “fails” to capture the essence of language in a name 
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or concept, this essence is indirectly disclosed – and thus “brought to 
word” – in the way in which the word works in naming and thereby 
granting relative permanence. Accordingly, Heidegger’s lecture is not 
primarily a discourse on (über) the essence of language, but rather 
allows an indirect encounter with this essence by drawing our atten-
tion to the way discoursing takes place from and on the basis of (von) 
language. This is what Heidegger means by “experience,” Erfahrung, 
in the emphatic sense: a journey (Fahrt) along the path of language as 
an event.40 
 The poet’s resignation or renouncement is a positive one – it is the 
-rst step in the transition from the modern ideal of a subjectivist and 
technological mastery of reality towards a wholly other approach. The 
resignation involved here corresponds to the attitude or mood that Hei-
degger, following Master Eckhart, calls Gelassenheit – “serenity” or, 
more literally, “releasement,” “surrender,” “having-let-go,” “letting-
be.”41 For him, this expression signi-es a transformation of the rela-
tionship to things and to oneself predominant in modernity – namely, 
willing, more precisely characterized by Nietzsche as will to power, in 
which things are ultimately disclosed as means or material for the 
boundless self-enhancement of subjectivity. However, “releasement” 
does not mean simply a passive submission to a higher, divine will; it is 
“beyond the distinction between activity and passivity.”42 Like the con-
cept of “resolve” (Entschlossenheit) in Being and Time, “releasement” 
rather signi-es a release from an exclusive concentration on things as 
present and a receptivity to their contextual background, which the 
later Heidegger calls Gegend or Gegnet, “region” or “country” – that 
against which (contra, gegen) things are encountered as present.43 
 With regard to the contemporary technological framework, “re-
leasement” means simply accepting that whereas the meaningfulness 
of things is normally and -rst and foremost constituted to us in terms 
of usefulness, instrumentality, and controllability, the fact that it is so 
constituted is not itself of our own making or under our control.44 The 
historically determined and contextual articulation of meaning – i.e., 
Being in the postmetaphysical sense – is not “subjective,” it is rather 
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what makes us into the “subjects” that we are. As this discursive ar-
ticulation is precisely the essence of language, “releasement,” in the 
case of language, means recognizing that the language we have grown 
into, the way of discussing and addressing things and their mutual 
relations prevalent in the speci-c historical world we live in, is not 
dependent on our will. Instead, it is we who are dependent upon the 
linguistic and discursive framework that precedes us. In the -rst in-
stance, it is language that “speaks”; the human being speaks only 
insofar as she “responds” or “corresponds” (entsprechen) to language, 
i.e., conforms to a linguistic framework and makes use of its -nite 
resources.45 The human being is -rst and foremost a recipient and cor-
respondent of language. With regard to language, releasement means 
letting meaningfulness show itself in the event of its discursive ar-
ticulation and accepting that this event itself remains inarticulate. 
The event of Being cannot be studied as something that is; nor can the 
happening of language be discussed in the same manner as linguisti-
cally articulated meanings. 
 Whereas naming words always more or less inevitably direct our 
attention to the beings that they name, the breakdown of the word 
makes us receptive to the unnamable “is,” the event of Being that 
lets beings be present. Thus Heidegger translates the last line of the 
poem to say, in a positive manner: “An ‘is’ arises where the word 
breaks down.”46 The breakdown of the word signals the discontinu-
ity, the rupture or “leap” (Sprung)47 entailed by the transition from 
metaphysics to another beginning – a transition that opens up a new 
experience of the “is,” of Being itself in its full dimensionality. The 
new realm disclosed by the breakdown is the uncontrollable back-
ground dimension of meaningfulness on which we ultimately depend, 
even though the full extent of this dependency is yet to be elaborated 
in Western thought.
 A comparable experience of a neglected and concealed background 
and of an unknown dependency is suggested by the work of Stefan 
George, in whose words I conclude:  
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Kehr in die heilige heimat
Findst ursprünglichen boden
Mit dem geschärfteren aug
Schlummender fülle schooss
Und so unbetretnes gebiet
Wie den -nsteren urwald … 
Turn back to the holy homeland
Find the original soil
With an eye now grown sharper
The bosom of slumbering fullness
And a district as unexplored
As the murkiest forest …48
Horch was die dumpfe erde spricht:
Du frei wie vogel oder -sch – 
Worin du hängst · das weisst du nicht.
Hear the earth’s roar from below: 
You who are free like birds or -sh – 
Your dependency · you do not know.49 
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